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Abstract. Threats to people and property in the wildland–urban interface have
taken on global proportions. It is becoming increasingly rare to have a wildland ﬁre
incident that does not involve people and their homes. In addition to Australia and
North America, people have died in interface ﬁres in Europe, Africa, and Asia,
including 212 people who died in the devastating forest ﬁres in northeastern China in
May 1987. The prevailing interface model is one that attempts to evacuate people
away from ﬁre areas to get them out of harm’s way. This traditional approach in the
U.S. has been preferred by law enforcement agencies and ﬁre services. The problem
with this model is that evacuation warnings are often late to non-existent, leading to
the deaths of interface residents entrapped by ﬁres on highways as they try to escape.
For example, 16 people suﬀered lethal burns when the 2003 Cedar and Paradise Fires
in California overran them as they were trying to evacuate. Two communities in the
United States have adopted variations of the Australian model of Prepare, Go Early,
or Stay and Defend (P/GE/SD). Oﬃcials in the Painted Rocks Fire District, Mon-
tana, and Rancho Santa Fe, California, were interviewed to determine how the Aus-
tralian model was being implemented. Two of the authors have ﬁrsthand experience
with these two case examples. P/GE/SD has been tested successfully at both loca-
tions. The Australian model, however, is under review following the Black Saturday
ﬁres of February 2009 in Victoria, Australia. The objective of this paper is to present
speciﬁc ideas that can be used to reform and improve ﬁre policy, planning, and
performance in the Wildland–Urban Interface in the United States.
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1. Introduction
The wildland–urban interface (WUI) and wildland–urban intermix (WUI) are the
areas where structures are built next to and among forests, shrublands, and grass-
lands [1]. The WUI poses a series of challenges to both rural and urban communi-
ties from ecosystem fragmentation, increased exposure to invasive species, water
and air pollution, loss of wildlife habitat, and wildﬁre [2]. These challenges are
exacerbated by the vulnerability of the WUI to rapid land-use change throughout
the United States and Australia [3].
Addressing land management and conservation concerns in the complex and
changing landscapes at the WUI requires the implementation of clear and eﬀective
policies. Such policies would integrate appropriate aspects of land use planning,
land management, urban design, community education, and ﬁre agency activities.
Wildﬁre (or ‘unplanned ﬁre’) is one of the most critical hazards facing these com-
munities in the WUI. It is a highly variable and seasonal hazard providing the
most extensive impact during infrequent extreme events [4]. The challenge is to
appropriately address and manage this hazard to lifestyle and other values that
communities in these areas hold.
In both the United States and Australia large numbers of home losses and
many fatalities have occurred. The ‘California Fire Siege’ [5] in 2003 and the
Black Saturday ﬁres in Victoria, Australia [6] are recent examples. Responses to
these events can include the boosting of suppression capacity, changed fuel man-
agement practices, and new building regulations. The threats to people and prop-
erty in the interface have taken on global proportions. It is becoming increasingly
rare to have a wildland ﬁre incident that does not involve people and their homes
[7]. In addition to Australia and the United States, people have died in interface
ﬁres in Mexico [8], Europe (e.g. [9]), Africa [10], and Asia, including 212 people
who died in the devastating forest ﬁres in northeastern China in May 1987 [11].
The ‘wildland’ (bush in Australia) side of the WUI may be grasslands, shrub-
lands, and forests of various types [12]. Major societal losses may occur adjacent
to each of these fuel types under certain circumstances. On the urban side of the
WUI, similarly, the nature of the houses and landscaping can vary from mansions
with manicured gardens to modest mobile homes in trailer parks with little space
for gardens. A wide range of urban and wildland situations can be subject to
intense wildﬁres with socially disastrous consequences [13].
Some eﬀorts have been developed in the United States to promote the use of
ignition resistant building materials, ember trapping ventilation systems, and crea-
tion of defensible space within 30 m of exterior walls in the WUI. The use of igni-
tion resistant building materials has been shown to be of major importance
regarding structure survival during wildﬁres in the United States [14] and Austra-
lia [15, 16]. While these aspects are critically important in determining structural
survival, few comprehensive laws or statutes exist in the United States addressing
the threat of external ignitions on structures [3]. One of the reasons for this lack
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of regulation governing the private side of the WUI is the American spirit of indi-
vidualism which resents government interference in closely guarded personal rights
[17, 18].
The objective of this paper is to present speciﬁc ideas that could be used to
reform and improve ﬁre policy and planning in the WUI in the United States. To
be achieved, substantive reform requires better development, dissemination, and
utilization of scientiﬁcally based information [19]. The ensuing discussion will
develop a conceptual agenda for this policy. We will discuss how two variations
of the 2001 Australasian Fire Authorities Council (AFAC) policy (e.g. see [20,
21]) of Prepare, Go Early or Stay and Defend (P/GE/SD) are being applied in
two communities in the United States to better safeguard life and property, and
how the policy is unfolding in Australia. Information from this paper should be
of interest to planners, managers, and policymakers working in or near the WUI;
and to residents who live in the interface.
2. Wildland–Urban Interface in the United States
Major ﬁre-prone WUI areas are located along the west coast of the United States,
the Colorado Front Range, Texas, and the northern Great Lakes States. The
WUI is also common on the fringe of major metropolitan centers such as
Los Angeles, Seattle, Denver, Dallas, Atlanta, Washington DC, New York, and
Boston [22]. The area being converted to WUI continues to increase throughout
the United States as people desiring a more rural lifestyle move into wildﬁre prone
areas [22].
The environmental consequences of urban expansion, and thus the length of the
WUI, are becoming increasingly evident. Former U.S. Forest Service Chief Dale
Bosworth [23] identiﬁed land conversion to urban use as one of the four main
threats to public and private forests in the United States. Public concern about
the social and environmental impacts of the WUI has grown in recent years
[24–26].
Throughout the western United States many key public concerns center on
wildﬁres in the WUI. Wildﬁres pose a direct and obvious threat to lives and struc-
tures. The socio-economic consequences of escaped ﬁres in the WUI far exceed
those in wildland areas alone. As a result, policy makers and land managers have
focused much attention on alleviating the threat of ﬁre in the WUI. A continuing
problem for land management agencies such as the U.S. Forest Service is the cost
of providing ﬁre suppression for the WUI. The Forest Service, whose focus is on
the management of federal wildlands, has a mandate to expend suppression
resources on wildland ﬁres [27], not on structure protection.
Programs have been initiated throughout the United States to address ﬁre prob-
lems in the WUI. These include zoning, growth boundaries, land acquisition, edu-
cation, community assistance programs, and procurement of conservation
easements. Debates currently exist in the United States over the speciﬁc types of
fuel treatments that are most appropriate in relatively remote federal forests [28].
However, the consensus regarding fuel treatments in the WUI is that treatments
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should reduce surface, ladder, and canopy fuels, regardless of forest types (e.g.
ponderosa pine (Pinus ponderosa Laws.), mixed conifer, lodgepole pine (Pinus con-
torta Loudon), (see [29]).
Several recent federal ﬁre policies in the United States such as the National Fire
Plan [30], the Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildﬁre Risks to Communi-
ties and the Environment: Ten-Year Comprehensive Strategy (TYCS) [31], and the
Healthy Forest Restoration Act [32] have speciﬁcally addressed ﬁre management
in the WUI. The HFRA speciﬁed that 50% of fuels treatments should take place
in the WUI to reduce fuel (vegetation) levels. This has led to the creation of com-
munity-based eﬀorts such as Firewise Communities and Fire Safe Councils that
are reducing fuel levels in the WUI using collaborative agreements [33].
Cova [34] concluded that many of our streets and freeways in the United States
are already beyond carrying capacity and when an emergency evacuation is added
to the situation, ﬂeeing residents, in the case of wildﬁre, will be stuck in gridlock,
thereby exposing evacuee’s to being burned while sitting in their vehicles. His con-
tention, just from the standpoint of traﬃc congestion during wildﬁre emergencies,
is that residents can be much safer staying in their ignition resistant homes, if
their homes and yards are indeed ignition resistant, and oﬀ the roads that are nee-
ded for emergency vehicle ingress and egress.
3. Wildland–Urban Interface in Australia
The WUI in Australia involves many residents [35]. Not all ﬁres can be quickly
controlled under all weather conditions and at all locations (see [36]). Thus, not
all houses can be protected under extreme circumstances. Under such extremes,
especially, people may ﬂee from ﬁres but may ﬁnd themselves in fatal situations as
a result. Out of such incidents, the AFAC policy of leave early or stay with the
house has arisen (see [20, 21]).
The AFAC policy, the P/GE/SD policy, encourages individuals to engage in
risk assessment and ﬁre planning processes so they can plan to either leave a
ﬁre prone area well before there is personal risk or to stay and defend their pre-
pared property (see [3, 20, 21]). The Australian concept of P/GE/SD received
wider acceptance following studies of the infamous Ash Wednesday ﬁres that
burned through parts of southeastern Australia in 1983 [20]. These studies
showed: (1) that most homes were lost as the result of airborne embers both
preceding the ﬁre front and continuing well after the main ﬁre front burned
through and (2) that most civilians had died from radiant heat exposure while
evacuating [20].
The P/GE/SD model, when appropriately employed, can turn local residents
into positive assets rather than be potential liabilities [36, 37]. If an unplanned ﬁre
threatens an urban area, the residents may be asked to either make an informed
decision to go early, or, stay and defend their prepared homes. Prepared means a
continually maintained ﬁre resistant home surrounded by a minimum of 30 m to
60 m of properly maintained ﬁre resistant landscaping in the United States,
called the home ignition zone [38]. A coordinated neighborhood approach may be
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needed in some places (see [4]). Going Early (GE) can even mean leaving properly
maintained homes on extreme ﬁre danger days and going to a safe location well
before the report of any unplanned ﬁres [21]. Residents are urged not to try and
get out at the last minute because roads may be obstructed by fallen trees and
smoke may obscure visibility [39], power-lines and power-poles may have fallen,
and the road may cross the path of the ﬁre.
Ideally, in this model, before the ﬁre arrives able-bodied residents who decide to
stay, after sending oﬀ children and elderly family members, will ﬁll up buckets,
pails, sinks, and bathtubs with water (alternate water supply for ﬁre suppression
in case residential water supply fails), close all doors and windows (to lessen the
chance of ember entry), pull drapes away from windows (decrease chance of
drapes igniting), pull furniture away from exterior walls, and ﬁll roof gutters with
water (to extinguish embers lodging there), for example. They may begin defend-
ing their homes (the D part of the model) from the barrage of airborne embers
that can precede the main ﬁre front. As the main ﬁre front approaches, residents
can retreat into their prepared homes while maintaining a careful watch on the
behavior of the advancing ﬁre front and checking for interior ignition, the Stay
(S) part of the model. When the wind driven ﬁre front passes by, usually within
several minutes, able bodied, properly dressed, and aware residents again emerge
from their homes with mops, buckets of water, and garden hoses, and continue
the Defend (D) part of the model by extinguishing any glowing or ﬂaming materi-
als on the home or in their yards. They must continue these checks on their prop-
erties and, if able, their neighbors’ properties, until the threat is abated.
Guidelines are available from local or regional emergency services (e.g. [40]). The
2009 Black Saturday ﬁres in Victoria, Australia [6], have resulted in a new ﬁre risk
category (catastrophic) that, if forecast, invokes a ‘‘leave the night before or early
in the morning’’ recommendation, while the next two lower ratings come with the
recommendation to ‘‘only stay if your home is well prepared, well constructed
and you can actively defend it’’ [see www.cfa.vic.gov.au/residents/summer/ﬁre
dangerratings.htm for Victoria; accessed 18 May 2010].
It is critical to note that not all ﬁres arrive with due warning. In many cases
even those who planned to leave will have to use their house as a shelter rather
than take the riskier option to ﬂee in a vehicle or on foot. History, so far, has
shown that late evacuation can be riskier than sheltering in place in these situa-
tions (see [20]). Haynes et al. [41] investigated the circumstances associated with
552 fatalities from Australian bushﬁres over the last 100 years or so (1900 to
2007–2008) and found that 32% died as a result of ‘‘late evacuation’’, 26% died
‘‘defending property outside’’, 8% who died were ‘‘inside defendable property’’,
6% died ‘‘travelling through the area unaware’’, 16% died in unknown situations,
and the remainder were in miscellaneous categories. A Royal Commission is delib-
erating on such matters in the light of the 173 deaths in 2009 in Victoria [6]. Thus,
Teague et al. [6, p. 188] noted that two-thirds of the fatalities that occurred on
Black Saturday occurred in homes. Why this is so has yet to be revealed but there
are many possibilities concerning local ﬁre, weather and fuel circumstances,
preparedness of people, properties and neighborhoods, and decision making etc.
Teague et al. [6, Chap. 7] set the scene.
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In New South Wales and, more recently, the Australian Capital Territory
(ACT), Community Fire Units have been established and promoted. In the ACT,
people in these units are trained, provided with personal protective equipment,
and given access to public water mains to enable local-area wetting down of fuels
(
www.esa.act.gov.au/ESAWebsite/content_actfb/community_ﬁre_units/
community_ﬁre_units.html; accessed 18 May 2010). In Victoria, the Community
Fire Guard program has an emphasis on understanding ﬁre and being prepared
for ﬁre occurrence [37]. Such groups of volunteers in small communities and on
the urban edge can complement the eﬀorts of city ﬁre brigades and volunteer and
government rural brigades.
Of course, each ﬁre-prone community has a wide demographic with varying
perceptions of risk to their assets and their willingness to engage in risk mitigation
strategies. The challenge is to provide the most accurate and detailed assessment
of risk that each individual may face both from the likelihood that a ﬁre event
may occur and the vulnerability that the community member may have to this
event [25, 42, 43]. There are also planning and building guidelines in Australia
designed to provide minimum performance standards for structures in bushﬁre
(wildﬁre) prone areas [44].
The Stay and Defend Strategy is based on the simple concept that ‘‘People Pro-
tect Houses and Houses Protect People’’ [20]. It is not the physical event (wildﬁre)
that is a major problem in itself except in terms of how that event impacts the
built environment and the social system [18]. It is not until the physical event
starts to have a signiﬁcant impact on things that humans value that eﬀorts are
made to either modify the hazard to their assets or reduce the impact of the haz-
ard to their assets by changing human behavior [25].
Changing the fuel structure and quantity is an important option both on the
property of a resident and in the urban and adjacent wildland environment, an
option that poses certain social and scientiﬁc challenges [4]. Fire suppression as an
option, while important, is outside the scope of our considerations here.
4. Montana Fire District Unites Residents to be Part
of the Solution
The Painted Rocks Fire District in western Montana adopted, in the Northern-
Hemisphere Fall of 2006, the Australian interface strategy of P/GE/SD, partly
predicated on the lessons learned from the 2003 southern California Fire Siege
described by Blackwell and Tuttle [5]. Mutch [45] described the event where ﬁfteen
Californian civilians received little to no evacuation warning that the fast spread-
ing Cedar and Paradise wildﬁres were imminent threats to their neighborhoods on
October 26, 2003. All ﬁfteen people burned to death, most while attempting to
escape, as they had no time to take proper precautions. One ﬁreﬁghter died a cou-
ple days later as he tried to save a home with his engine crew. Six other civilians,
men between the ages of 54 and 93, died of heart attacks as they watched the Old
Fire in San Bernardino County destroy their homes. The 23rd person who died
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was a transient whose burned body was found in the path of the Cedar Fire in
San Diego County. Oﬃcials in this western Montana Fire District decided that it
was far better to prepare defensible property far in advance of a ﬁre out-
break—and then go early or stay and defend property against the ember ﬁres,
depending on the inclination of the residents.
State law in Montana speciﬁes that people cannot be forced to evacuate their
homes when a ﬁre occurs (Reference: MCA 10-3-104 (2), 10-3-406). Instead, they
sign a waiver releasing local authorities of any responsibility should serious prob-
lems arise. Despite such a law, U.S. ﬁre services and law enforcement personnel
prefer to remove people from the ﬁre area (in the belief that this is the safest
action and, therefore, the lowest liability to ﬁre managers) to get them out of the
way of emergency responders. The removal of able-bodied residents can often be
detrimental to structure survival and public safety.
In Montana, many neighbors in the West Fork of the Bitterroot River area
refused to be evacuated by the Sheriﬀ’s Department when the Razor Fire threa-
tened their homes in August 2000. The senior author of this paper was there.
They banded together to protect the neighborhood, thinning trees to create surviv-
able space, installing sprinkler systems, ﬁghting ﬁre, and providing local intelli-
gence to incoming ﬁre services. The integration of this neighborhood force with
the ﬁre services was recognized as an eﬀective strategy in protecting homes and
property. No lives or homes were lost in the area although high intensity crown
ﬁres and spot ﬁres across ﬁre lines were present. During the 2000 ﬁre season there
was not an authorized Fire Protection District in this area. One year later, resi-
dents who had been threatened by the previous year’s wildﬁres approved the for-
mation of the Painted Rocks Fire District based on a force of volunteer
ﬁreﬁghters.
The Painted Rocks Fire District in this isolated Montana community along the
West Fork of the Bitterroot River called their new interface protection policy
‘‘Prepare: Go Early or Stay and Defend’’ (P/GE/SD). This strategic title implies
that every resident in the Fire District prepares their property in advance to be
ﬁre resistant, regardless of whether they are going to leave early or stay. This is
perhaps the ﬁrst retro-community in the U.S. to adopt this system, meaning that
residents must now prepare their property to be defensible before they can safely
stay. When wildﬁre threatens these Montana homes, able-bodied residents who
prepared their homes may choose to shelter inside their homes when the ﬁre front
passes through and then emerge to protect their property.
The volunteer ﬁreﬁghters of the Painted Rocks Fire District work with their
community residents to achieve Firewise standards and show residents how to
defend their homes (Figure 1). Through voluntary inspections and spring wildland
ﬁre training courses, local residents can create islands of safety for their homes
and families and be prepared to stay and ﬁght ﬁres. Upon completing the spring
two-day P/GE/SD training in 2008, residents received a photo Identiﬁcation Card
that certiﬁed the training and allows the card holders passage through law
enforcement roadblocks to get back to their homes when ﬁres occur. Those who
choose not to stay are encouraged to go early. Leaving late has resulted in more
deaths than any other cause during major wildland ﬁres in the United States and
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Australia [20, 45]. Panic, poor visibility, and road hazards create accidents that
leave people stranded with no protection from smoke, heat, and ﬁre.
By taking responsibility for the protection of their own homes, residents free up
important ﬁreﬁghting resources to attack the wildland ﬁre and roads are more
open for emergency vehicle ingress and egress. This does not mean that ﬁreﬁghters
would not suppress ﬁres on these prepared properties; quite the opposite is true.
Fireﬁghters are more likely to enter properties where owners have demonstrated
an investment in their own protection, and these property are safer for ﬁreﬁghters
to enter and ﬁght ﬁre. But the goal in Painted Rocks is for homeowners to make
their properties so safe that intense ﬁre suppression for the defense of their homes
is not required.
In summary, the WUI vision in this Montana community is one where people
and houses are able to survive ﬁres even when ﬁre services personnel are not
available. The Painted Rocks Fire District re-evaluated their reliance on the
‘‘evacuation only’’ policy as a meaningful interface strategy and adopted a diﬀer-
ent one that oﬀered choices. Once a resident prepares their home, they can either
Go Early, or Stay and Defend. As the Fall 2009 Firewise Newsletter of the
National Fire Protection Association so clearly indicated: ‘‘The growing number
of homes within the wildland–urban interface, coupled with the limited resources
available to wildland ﬁreﬁghters, suggest that we need to explore new solutions
that will make the process safer for all involved when a wildﬁre threatens lives
and property.’’ The responding team at Painted Rocks consists of the eﬀective
partnership between ﬁre services and home dwellers. The emergency response
theme is comprised of the dual strategy of adequate defendable space and ﬁre
resistant homes coupled with the trained and prepared home dweller’s motivation
to remain on-site and assist with the suppression of spot ﬁres.
The Fall 2009 Firewise Newsletter also emphasized another signiﬁcant point:
‘‘While Prepare/Go Early/Stay and Defend places greater responsibility with
Figure 1. District firefighter Erica Tresemer leads residents through a
sand table exercise at the Painted Rocks Fire Station in June 2008
(Photo: Bob Mutch).
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homeowners, it also oﬀers choices. By learning more about this approach, we can
arm ourselves with further options, with each community better able to determine
the best approach for its residents.’’
5. Sheltering in Place: Rancho Santa Fe in San Diego
County, California—A Model for Staying
Another possible model for future community ﬁre protection is taking place at
Rancho Santa Fe in southern California. This program is actively informed by the
second author’s experience. Information produced by the Rancho Santa Fe Pro-
tection District titled ‘‘Sheltering in Place During Wildﬁres—a Modern Approach
to Living Safely in a Wildland/Urban Interface Community’’ describes how this
concept will work in ﬁve of the newer Rancho Santa Fe communities. Southern
California, and in particular, San Diego County, has been reluctant to embrace
the P/GE/SD policy.
5.1. Rancho Santa Fe’s Shelter in Place Strategy
The closest southern California comes to the P/GE/SD model is the concept of
Shelter in Place (SIP), which requires residents to leave early in an orderly manner
if they can. The only designated SIP developments in southern California at Ran-
cho Santa Fe require Ignition Resistant Homes surrounded by well-maintained
Ignition Resistant Landscaping (Figure 2). In the event the resident does not have
time to leave before the wildﬁre arrives the residents are to ‘‘Shelter’’ inside their
homes and stay there. In the current SIP model there is, at present, little to no
emphasis on taking ﬁre suppression actions outside the home once the ﬁre front
passes. Other than the ongoing pre-ﬁre preparation, the SIP resident has a passive
role in the defense of his or her property during a wildﬁre event.
The usual practice throughout southern California is to require evacuations well
ahead of the arrival of the wildﬁre [3]. For instance, in October of 2007 the wild-
ﬁres in San Diego County resulted in the largest evacuation in California history
(over 300,000 people safely evacuated) and the loss of 2,223 homes [25]. Many
residents have always deﬁed these orders and stayed behind to protect their prop-
erty. A few in the past have lost their lives while most have been instrumental in
saving their homes and the homes of their absent neighbors. When multiple major
wind-driven wildﬁres are occurring throughout southern California there never
will be enough ﬁre engines, trained and equipped ﬁreﬁghters (as in the Canberra,
Australia, 2003 ﬁres [36]), or law enforcement personnel to be in every threatened
and evacuated neighborhood.
The San Diego County community of Rancho Santa Fe adopted SIP under the
forward thinking and guidance of former Fire Chief Erwin Willis and Fire Mar-
shal Cliﬀ Hunter. They implemented the SIP strategy in 2004 in ﬁve of the newer
Rancho Santa Fe developments. This concept received its ﬁrst real test during the
Firestorms of October 2007. SIP and P/GE/SD both require homeowner educa-
tion. The big emphasis in both models is on preparedness well ahead of the ﬁre
season. When a wildﬁre occurs, people leave early or stay within the safety of
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their ignition resistant homes. They are trained not to panic and not to leave at
the last possible moment, as this is when citizens can lose their lives and put ﬁre-
ﬁghter’s lives needlessly at risk. If your house is ignited and you don’t put it out
or leave the building, you will be in real trouble.
5.1.1. Evolution of Shelter in Place at Rancho Santa Fe. How did Rancho Santa
Fe come to embrace the concept of SIP when other southern California wildﬁre
prone communities have not done so? The concept grew out of studies following
the 1990 Paint Fire in Santa Barbara, CA, where 438 homes were lost and one
resident was killed [46] attempting to evacuate, and the 1991 Oakland Hills Tun-
nel Fire [47] where 2,475 homes were incinerated and 25 people were killed with
24 of them losing their lives while trying to ﬂee. Erwin Willis, then Fire Marshal
with the City of San Luis Obispo, thought ‘‘it made no sense that so many resi-
dents were losing their lives ﬂeeing structures that we were teaching our ﬁreﬁght-
ers to seek shelter in if trapped by a ﬁre storm’’ [48]. After reading these studies
Willis became convinced that structures and communities could be built that
would be safe from wildland ﬁres and residents would not have to risk their lives
trying to evacuate. These studies also showed that there was no diﬀerence in the
survival rates of structures protected by either homeowners or ﬁreﬁghters.
5.2. ‘‘Shelter in Place’’ at Rancho Santa Fe Tested
The SIP concept was not tested in a major wildﬁre until the October 22, 2007,
Witch Creek Fire. This occurred during a period of intense Santa Ana winds and
several major wildﬁres had already broken out in southern California, which sig-
niﬁcantly reduced the number of available ground and air ﬁreﬁghting resources.
By Sunday evening and early Monday morning the Witch Creek Fire was burning
homes in Ramona, Poway, and Rancho Bernardo and later spread into the SIP
communities of Cielo, 4S Ranch, and The Crosby. Because there was so much
Figure 2. Rancho Santa Fe Fire Marshall Cliff Hunter (Center) does a
final house inspection at one of the Rancho Santa Fe’s new ‘‘Shelter-
In-Place’’ ignition resistant homes (Photo: Bob Mutch).
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advance warning about the projected path of the Witch Creek Fire, evacuation
orders were given early for an orderly evacuation of all of Rancho Santa Fe
through a very eﬀective Reverse 911 system. However, many homeowners in the
SIP communities decided to stay, as they had purposely bought homes in a SIP
development. During the assessment of home saves and losses, it became readily
apparent that no homes were lost in any of the SIP communities. Some residents
stayed in The Crosby, some stayed in 4S Ranch (but most left), many stayed in
Cielo, and most left in The Bridges. Most residents played a passive role, staying
in their homes and taking no direct action before or after the ﬁre front passed.
There was an abundance of physical evidence left behind (broken oﬀ trees and
burned over interior open space areas with native vegetation) that strong winds
had severely impacted the SIP Community of 4S Ranch and had indeed pushed
the Witch Creek Fire directly through 4S Ranch.
Although there were no homes lost in any of the ﬁve SIP communities, the
older parts of Rancho Santa Fe did not fare as well. There were 61 structure los-
ses, the largest structure was 12,000 ft2 (1100 m2) in size and the smallest was
400 ft2 (37 m2) in size. A few residents in the non-SIP communities decided to
stay, but the main water system ran out of water. Inappropriate landscaping was
a primary cause in 50 out of the 61 losses with those 50 homes having less than
30 ft (9 m) of fuel modiﬁcation from undisturbed wildland fuels and ﬂammable
ornamental vegetation. Of the other eleven losses, the landscaping was intact and
unburned, yet the structures were burned to the ground due to embers getting into
attics via dormer and eave vents. Twelve of the lost homes had wooden siding
with bark mulch that went right up to the wooden siding material on the struc-
ture. Uncovered trash cans next to structures, bark mulch in contact with the
structure, and storage or out buildings located right next to structures all contrib-
uted to the loss of homes [49].
All of the San Diego County newspapers highlighted the successful implementa-
tion of the SIP concept, which borrows in part from the very successful Austra-
lian model of P/GE/SD. Hunter was overwhelmed with requests for personal
interviews from near and far. No lives had been lost and no homes were lost in
the ﬁve SIP communities, which was in sharp contrast to the number of homes
lost in the rest of San Diego County in October of 2007 and particularly within
the City of San Diego.
There were other areas of new homes in the path of the Witch Creek Wildﬁre
located in unincorporated areas well east of Rancho Santa Fe where property
owners elected to stay with their homes to defend them before and after the ﬁre
front passed through [50]. These residents were strongly encouraged to evacuate
well in advance of the main ﬁre front as these areas are not designated as SIP,
although most of the homes possessed all of the attributes of a P/GE/SD commu-
nity. As a case in point, newer homes east of Ramona on Starlight Mountain
Road were overrun by the Witch Creek wildﬁre at approximately 5:00 PM on
Sunday evening, October 21, 2007. Several homeowners chose to stay while others
evacuated. Those who stayed were instrumental in saving their homes and, in
some cases, their neighbors’ homes. In one case two new homes that met all upda-
ted County of San Diego Wildland Urban Interface Code Requirements survived
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without any intervention. Another brand new home that met all code require-
ments, with no one there, burned to the ground several hours after the ﬁre front
passed through.
Eyewitnesses were clear that homes were not igniting because of direct ﬂame
impingement or radiant heat. All of the homes that eventually burned were still
standing for several hours after the passage of the ﬁre front. The homes were
burning due to the continuous onslaught of windblown embers coming from the
burned over area that found their way into the attics, and in one case, embers got
beneath a pre-manufactured home. When able-bodied residents are forced to evac-
uate they give up any chance of saving their own home and the homes of their
neighbors. Fire Service personnel are spread too thin to have a ﬁreﬁghter at every
home of those residents who were evacuated. No Fire Service personnel were
available to assist any of the residents who stayed, or to protect the abandoned
homes of those who evacuated their homes on Starlight Mountain Road on
October 21, 2007.
There is a big concern in County and City Government circles about potential
liability should a homeowner perish in the defense of his or her home. Consider,
however, the liability when all residents are forced to leave and the wildﬁre over-
runs the evacuation route killing thousands gridlocked on clogged escape routes.
On October 26, 2003, the residents of Scripps Ranch, a community within the
City of San Diego, received an early morning notice to evacuate. Residents spent
two to three hours stuck in their cars in their own neighborhoods trying to get
out while the Cedar Fire burned through the Community of Scripps Ranch,
resulting in the loss of more than 300 homes. A sudden wind shift would have
spelled disaster for thousands of evacuee’s (Figure 3). Fortunately that did not
happen.
Of the 17 people killed in the 2003 wildﬁres in San Diego County, most of the
fatalities occurred while residents were trying to evacuate [45]. Cova [34] stated
that dense developments may discourage consideration of P/GE/SD policies due
to the greater possibility of house-to-house ignitions. However, an assessment in
Canberra, Australia, identiﬁed more than one case where homes in moderately
populated areas were saved by residents who stayed and defended even though
structures next door were lost due to house-to-house ignition [51]. Cohen [52]
indicated a 2-story house separation of 14 m (46 ft) or more would not produce
ignitions from ﬂame exposure (10 m/33 ft for a 1-story house).
Following the latest wildﬁres in Santa Barbara, Ventura, Los Angeles, and
Orange Counties, in November 2008, County Fire Chiefs in Ventura and Orange
Counties were conducting meetings in their communities to get a measure of pub-
lic interest in and acceptance of a ‘‘P/GE/SD’’ strategy and were beginning to
develop instructional materials that explain this approach. However, following the
south-eastern Australian bushﬁres of February 2009 this emerging policy has been
rethought and retitled, ‘‘Ready, Set, Go’’—cf. ‘‘Prepare, Act, Survive’’ now used
in Australia [see www.cfa.vic.gov.au/, accessed 18 May 2010]—with a renewed
emphasis on pre-ﬁre preparation of the home and property, maintaining the home
and ﬁre resistant landscaping in a constant state of readiness, but leaving early
when the wildﬁre event occurs. There is no longer an emphasis on Staying and
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Defending although this new policy acknowledges that some residents will elect to
stay behind and that they should be properly equipped and mentally and physi-
cally prepared to actively defend their homes if they do decide to Stay and
Defend. Once it is safe to do so, residents that stayed behind are advised to thor-
oughly check their home, yard, roof, attic, etc. for ember ﬁres; and to use a hose
or ﬁre extinguisher to suppress any spot ﬁres or smoldering embers. To be consid-
ered an SIP community, the entire community must be designed to withstand
heat, ﬂames, and embers from an approaching wildﬁre (see also [4]). This means
that every home must share the same ignition-resistant design elements, including
a well-maintained ﬁre district approved vegetation management plan. An addi-
tional feature is the on-going requirement to continue to maintain all ﬁre resistant
landscaping and ignition-resistant housing components in perpetuity.
6. The Status of Policies Following Black Saturday,
February 7, 2009 in Victoria, Australia
Public policy, scientiﬁc advice, and local practice are outcomes of knowledge
accumulated from past events and experiences combined with various rationales.
The greater the number of events that occur, the wider is the range of circum-
stances that are experienced and can be scrutinized. With each new event, there is
Figure 3. Thousands of evacuees heading north on the I-15 Freeway,
just south of the Miramar Way off ramp. They are cut off with no
escape as the Cedar Fire blew across the Freeway early Sunday morn-
ing of October 26, 2003, on the Marine Corps Air Station Miramar
property. There were just as many stranded vehicles in the south
bound lanes that are not shown. A sudden shift in the wind would
have burned thousands trapped in their vehicles. In this case, fortu-
nately no one was burned over. Do evacuees present a liability to
local governments when mass evacuations are ordered and the evacu-
ees are burned over while trapped on clogged roads and freeways
resulting in numerous fatalities? (Photo: Unknown private citizen).
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increased opportunity for adding to current knowledge and, therefore, gaining
greater scientiﬁc and public understanding and having a better chance of develop-
ing an eﬀective, comprehensive, policy (see Fig. 4).
The many ﬁres of February 2009 in Victoria, Australia, took 173 human lives
and burned over 2000 houses [6]. A widespread and long-standing drought pro-
vided the background to extreme ﬁre weather. Fuels supporting these ﬁres were
widely diﬀerent across the State with rural pastures, woodlands, and forests all
involved. Tall forests of mountain ash (Eucalyptus regnans F. Muell.) found in
what are normally high rainfall districts, were close to some hard hit areas such as
Marysville: these are singled out here for comment because Wilson and Ferguson
[39], after the socially disastrous Ash Wednesday ﬁres of 1983, noted that ‘‘The
results of this survey suggest that evacuation should not be considered lightly, if
at all. While residents of houses surrounded by exceptionally high concentrations
of fuel, such as those near mountain ash gullies, might sometimes be wise to evac-
uate temporarily to safer places nearby, by far the greater proportion of houses
oﬀer relatively safe havens during the passage of a ﬁre.’’
In May 2009, a Royal Commission began formal hearings which examined the
stay or go policy among other aspects of the ﬁres [6, pp. 15, 19 and Chap. 7].
This policy had also been examined in the inquiry into the 2003 bushﬁres in the
ACT [21]. In 2001, Australian police commissioners (Queensland aside at that
time) accepted the AFAC policy but, in the 2003 Canberra event, there appeared
to have been conﬂicting advice given to residents [21]. What happened in Victoria
will be revealed in the Commission’s ﬁnal report in 2010. The interim report indi-
cated the importance of the public understanding what the policy means and com-













Figure 4. Each new fire incident, or event, provides a new opportu-
nity to reassess accepted practices and revise interface strategies and
tactics based on the additional information. How we respond to inter-
face fires needs to be a continuously evolving process.
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In the AFAC policy, the major options are not of concern—stay or evacu-
ate—because these are the only alternatives. It is the detail that is important:
What does ‘prepare’ involve? What does ‘leave early’ involve? How do these ques-
tions apply to diﬀerent people in diﬀerent circumstances? Aspects of these ques-
tions have been covered above and there are many answers possible, but many of
the ramiﬁcations have not necessarily been adopted or resolved. Thus, ‘prepara-
tion’ may involve fuel management and suppression in whole neighborhoods and
include public land, not just one urban lot, so that risk needs to be assessed at an
appropriate scale [4]. ‘Leaving early’ could involve leaving on every ‘‘extreme’’, or
now ‘‘catastrophic’’, ﬁre day or on a ‘total ﬁre ban day’ with or without known
ﬁre occurrence (see [20]) according to people’s perception of risk. Evacuation
strategies could diﬀer for diﬀerent people such as nursing home residents and
those with disabilities compared with single young people and families. ‘‘Leaving
early’’ also involves the time required to safely reach a known safe haven; and,
preparing for the heat, smoke, embers, darkness, and noise of an extreme event.
These circumstances are diﬃcult to imagine for those who have not experienced
them.
The events of Black Saturday invoked a great deal of public discussion over the
inﬂuence of climate change on ﬁre potential. While the apparently unprecedented
severity of the ﬁre weather during this single event cannot be attributed to climate
change with any certainty, it is consistent with predictions of future ﬁre weather
[53] and upward trends in the forest ﬁre weather index in Victoria over the some-
what limited decades of measured weather [54]. However, change of some sort is
inevitable, whether in population, fuels, weather or technology, and this will
potentially aﬀect policy.
7. Conclusions
For many years the United States has supported a policy of controlled evacua-
tions administered by local law enforcement oﬃcials when WUI areas are threa-
tened by wildﬁres. When fast moving wildﬁres occur, emergency evacuation
communication to interface residents often arrives so late that numerous individu-
als are imperiled. As civilian fatalities all too clearly demonstrated in the 1991
Tunnel Fire near Oakland, California, and the 2003 Cedar Fire in San Diego
County, California, warnings to evacuate may be late to non-existent.
Recent losses of life and property in the WUI to wildﬁre in both the United
States and Australia continue at high levels. While policies and investments have
occurred in the last decade on the public side of the WUI in the United States,
corresponding policies and investments on the private side of the WUI are gener-
ally lacking. This article summarized two areas in the United States, Painted
Rocks in Montana and Rancho Santa Fe in California, which have taken actions
to increase their survivability in the WUI. However, other areas with similar char-
acteristics and strategies are rare.
Thus, we can promote close examination of the Australian system of P/GE/SD
in the United States, perhaps with modiﬁcations in light of the ﬁndings of the
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2009 Victorian Bushﬁres Royal Commission [6]. This ﬁre management strategy
actively engages the occupants of the WUI in actions that can reduce losses of life
and property [3]. Although annual fuel treatments will not eliminate ﬁre; they will
eﬀectively modify ﬁre behavior. Under extreme weather conditions embers will
still be produced from adjacent wildland vegetation and these embers will attack
the private side of the WUI. If landscaping and structures are not designed and
built speciﬁcally to resist ember attack, they will be very vulnerable to ﬁre and
many of them will be lost. However, if residents accept the fact of inevitable wild-
ﬁres in the interface and accept the fact of their responsibility to prepare a ﬁre
resistant home and landscaping well in advance of subsequent ﬁre seasons, then
they will ﬁnd themselves in the enviable position of having interface choices: either
Going really Early ahead of wildﬁre threats or Staying and Defending their home
against the inevitable ember attack.
Residents and oﬃcials of the Painted Rocks and Rancho Santa Fe Fire
Districts appreciate the fact that reliance on Prepare/Go Early/Stay and Defend
places greater responsibility with homeowners. But they also know that there are
advantages in having choices when fast moving wildﬁres threaten. By implement-
ing and successfully testing alternatives to the ‘‘evacuation only’’ model, these two
Districts, one in Montana and one in California, have clearly demonstrated mean-
ingful beneﬁts in having options for interface survival—survival that includes the
resident as an essential participant.
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ADDENDUM
DEBUNKING MYTHS ABOUT: PREPARE, GO EARLY, OR STAY
AND DEFEND (P/GE/SD)
THE BASIC PREMISE: For people to successfully evacuate early or successfully
stay and defend their home, they must ﬁrst and foremost prepare defensible space
around their home, and perhaps in their neighborhood generally, and meet ﬁre
resistant building codes, regulations, and requirements. Defensible space and ﬁre
372 Fire Technology 2011
resistant homes accomplished well ahead of the ﬁre season will permit the eﬀective
execution of the other two tactics: Going Early or Staying and Defending. If
home and yard have not been prepared to be ﬁre resistant then the only safe tac-
tic is Go Early—really early. If people are unable to cope with ﬁre conditions for
various reasons they should also leave very early. However, leaving a well main-
tained ﬁre resistant property ‘‘early’’, as opposed to leaving an unprepared prop-
erty ‘‘early’’, does increase the probability that the home will survive and still be
there when the homeowner/resident who leaves early is allowed to return. The
safety of people is paramount.
MYTH: In a ﬁre all residents will die in their homes.
FACT: Many, if not most, victims perish while attempting to evacuate, usually
going at the very last minute.
MYTH: Homes in the interface generally are ignited by the adjacent ﬂames of a
crown ﬁre.
FACT: As stated above, homes in the interface generally are ignited by small
wind-blown embers. Ignited homes can be lost hours after the main ﬁre front has
passed. If someone is present, these small ember ignitions can be easily sup-
pressed. If no one is present, a home may easily burn to the ground much later.
MYTH: Homes threatened by wildﬁre cannot provide a safe refuge for people.
FACT: Homes repeatedly have provided a safe refuge for both ﬁreﬁghters and
residents, shielding them from the radiant heat and dense smoke that accompany
wildﬁres. Homes may eventually ignite, but by that time it is usually safe for
people to go back outside because the main front has passed. However, people
have died in poorly maintained and unsafe homes.
MYTH: People seeking refuge in a home threatened by wildﬁre will be asphyxi-
ated.
FACT: People, both residents and ﬁreﬁghters, often have been eﬀectively shel-
tered by a home that blocks radiant heat and smoke.
MYTH: When wildﬁres threaten homes during periods of extreme ﬁre danger,
the Fire Service will save them.
FACT: Wildﬁres that start during periods of very high to extreme ﬁre danger will
quickly overwhelm Fire Services, because they will not be able to keep up with
all the new ignitions in the interface. It must be understood that there are hun-
dreds or thousands of engines (‘tankers’) and tens of thousands to hundreds of
thousands of homes in the interface. There will not be an engine at every home.
The good news is that if people prepare well for defensible space around their
home and have a ﬁre resistant home in a well-prepared neighborhood, their
property may survive a wildﬁre even when the Fire Services are not available.
MYTH: Some people are saying that anyone can stay inside their home and ride
out the ﬁre storm after preparing home and property to be ﬁre resistant.
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FACT: Only able bodied adults, properly prepared both physically and mentally,
should consider staying behind to defend their well prepared ﬁre resistant homes.
Children, inﬁrm people, and elderly residents should leave early, well before the
arrival of any wind-blown embers or ﬂames. Those who stay need to know what
‘well prepared’ means in their circumstances.
MYTH: Some people are suggesting that the strategy of Prepare/Go Early/Stay
and Defend can be applied in all communities.
FACT: The houses that have been burning in Wildland Urban Interface ﬁres in
the United States were not in planned communities with adequate individual fuel
treatment zones (homes in newer ﬁre planned communities are not burning).
Older communities, however, can be retroﬁtted and there is grant money in the
United States available to make structures ignition resistant, but this requires
every homeowner/resident to agree to and actually modify their structure to
updated ﬁre codes.
MYTH: Prepare/Go Early/Stay and Defend is being brought forward as a plan-
ning strategy to be used where there is only one way in and one way out and
timely evacuation of a proposed planned community is not possible.
FACT: Prepare/Go Early/Stay and Defend is not used in lieu of not having ade-
quate evacuation routes. Prepare/Go Early/Stay and Defend cannot work as a
viable strategy without safe evacuation routes.
MYTH: Prepare/Go Early/Stay and Defend applies to all situations.
FACT: The circumstances of ﬁres and communities now and in a changing world
vary widely. There is no guarantee that staying and sheltering or staying and
defending will guarantee your survival under all possible circumstances.
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